Chaffin v. Brame
233 N.C. 377, 64 S.E.2d 276 (1951)
Facts: Plaintiff was driving on a highway when defendant approached from the opposite direction. Defendant refused to dim his lights, temporarily blinding plaintiff; plaintiff then ran into an unlit truck that had been blocking the whole right lane.
Procedure: Trial found for the plaintiff; defendant appeals.
Issue: Was plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: Since he was blinded by the lights and reacted reasonably by slowing down, the whole don't-drive-faster-than-your-lights doctrine doesn't apply.
Wednesday, September 17, 2008
Marshall v. Southern Railway Co.
Marshall v. Southern Railway Co.
233 N.C. 38, 62 S.E.2d 489 (1950)
Facts: Defendant's train tracks had supports by a road; plaintiff ran into them because he was distracted by another driver's brights.
Procedure: Trial judge sustained defendant's motion for nonsuit.
Issue: Was there a suit?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: Plaintiff failed to exercise due care as a driver.
233 N.C. 38, 62 S.E.2d 489 (1950)
Facts: Defendant's train tracks had supports by a road; plaintiff ran into them because he was distracted by another driver's brights.
Procedure: Trial judge sustained defendant's motion for nonsuit.
Issue: Was there a suit?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: Plaintiff failed to exercise due care as a driver.
Tuesday, September 16, 2008
Brown Machine, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc.
Brown Machine, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc.
Missouri Court of Appeals
770 S.W.2d 416 (1989)
Facts: Oi... the companies did the same old rigamarole of ignoring each other's forms. Brown sold a machine to Hercules using this amazing process. A Hercules employee sued Brown for injuries sustained working at the machine in Hercules' plant. Case turns on which form was the contract or held the controlling terms, since that would indicate who could be held liable. Brown settled the case and then sued Hercules, saying that Hercules should have been liable by the "contract."
Procedure: Trial court found for Brown; Hercules appeals.
Issue: Did Brown's acknowledgment containing the indemnity provision constitute a counter offer, of an acceptance of Hercules' offer with additional/different terms?
Holding: Yes.
Reasoning: Brown's machine order acknowledgment is not a counter offer, so it must be an acceptance with different terms. Since Hercules' purchase order specifically limited it to the stated terms, Brown's terms fall into the abyss.
Monday, September 15, 2008
Princess Cruises, Inc. v. General Electric Co.
Princess Cruises, Inc. v. General Electric Co.
United States Court of Appeals
143 F.3d 828 (4th Cir. 1998)
Facts: Princess scheduled a inspection and repair stop with GE. They negotiated on the terms and settled on GE's last proposal. During the course of repairs, there were delays that caused Princess to have to cancel a Christmas and Easter cruise. Princess sued for breach of contract.
Procedure: Trial court found for Princess. GE renewed a motion for a verdict as a matter of law and was denied; GE appeals.
Issue: Should a court rely on the UCC for a contract primarily for services?
Holding: No, common law applies.
Reasoning: UCC doesn't apply to admiralty law regardless of the nature of the transaction, i.e. goods v. services matters. The contract was in fact primarily for services. Thus, common law principles of form apply, so GE's form was the only one the jury should have used in calculating damages, and that form limited GE's liability. "We reverse the district court's decision denying GE's motion for judgement as a matter of law and remand for entry of judgment against GE in the amount of $231,925.00, interest to accumulate from the date of the original judgment.
United States Court of Appeals
143 F.3d 828 (4th Cir. 1998)
Facts: Princess scheduled a inspection and repair stop with GE. They negotiated on the terms and settled on GE's last proposal. During the course of repairs, there were delays that caused Princess to have to cancel a Christmas and Easter cruise. Princess sued for breach of contract.
Procedure: Trial court found for Princess. GE renewed a motion for a verdict as a matter of law and was denied; GE appeals.
Issue: Should a court rely on the UCC for a contract primarily for services?
Holding: No, common law applies.
Reasoning: UCC doesn't apply to admiralty law regardless of the nature of the transaction, i.e. goods v. services matters. The contract was in fact primarily for services. Thus, common law principles of form apply, so GE's form was the only one the jury should have used in calculating damages, and that form limited GE's liability. "We reverse the district court's decision denying GE's motion for judgement as a matter of law and remand for entry of judgment against GE in the amount of $231,925.00, interest to accumulate from the date of the original judgment.
Hudson-Connor v. Putney
Hudson-Connor v. Putney
192 Or. App. 488, 86 P.3d 106 (2004)
Facts: Defendant allowed an 11 year old boy to drive her golf cart. The boy made a mistake and hit the plaintiff, breaking her leg.
Procedure: Trial court found for the defendant.
Issue: Should the defendant be held to an adult standard of care?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: Since golf carts are not inherently dangerous and the operation of one by a minor is not an adult activity, the handing over of one to another minor is also not an adult activity.
192 Or. App. 488, 86 P.3d 106 (2004)
Facts: Defendant allowed an 11 year old boy to drive her golf cart. The boy made a mistake and hit the plaintiff, breaking her leg.
Procedure: Trial court found for the defendant.
Issue: Should the defendant be held to an adult standard of care?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: Since golf carts are not inherently dangerous and the operation of one by a minor is not an adult activity, the handing over of one to another minor is also not an adult activity.
Robinson v. Lindsay
Robinson v. Lindsay
92 Wash.2d 410, 598 P.2d 392 (1979)
Facts: Robinson got her thumb injured by Anderson while he was operating a snowmobile.
Procedure: Trial court found for Anderson; they then ordered a new trial since the jury instructions should have included something about adult standard of care. Appeal is over that decision.
Issue: Should a minor operating a snowmobile be held to an adult standard of care?
Holding: Yes.
Reasoning: When involved in dangerous activities, minors should be held to an adult standard of care. Though accidents can occur
92 Wash.2d 410, 598 P.2d 392 (1979)
Facts: Robinson got her thumb injured by Anderson while he was operating a snowmobile.
Procedure: Trial court found for Anderson; they then ordered a new trial since the jury instructions should have included something about adult standard of care. Appeal is over that decision.
Issue: Should a minor operating a snowmobile be held to an adult standard of care?
Holding: Yes.
Reasoning: When involved in dangerous activities, minors should be held to an adult standard of care. Though accidents can occur
Wilson v. Sibert
Wilson v. Sibert
535 P.ed 1034 (Alaska 1975)
Facts: Plaintiff, Wilson, pulled up behind defendant, Sibert, at a drive-in window. When the car in front of Sibert suddenly reversed, Sibert reacted by shifting into reverse and driving backwards, thus slamming into Wilson's car.
Procedure: Trial court found that Sibert was not negligent; Plaintiff appeals.
Issue: Did the court err in denying a motion for directed verdict? Did it err in adding the sudden emergency doctrine to the jury instructions (by prejudicing the jury)?
Holding: No and No.
Reasoning: The motion was correctly denied because the facts allowed for a reasonable diversity of opinions. Jury instructions are left up to the trial court unless there is evidence of an abuse of discretion.
535 P.ed 1034 (Alaska 1975)
Facts: Plaintiff, Wilson, pulled up behind defendant, Sibert, at a drive-in window. When the car in front of Sibert suddenly reversed, Sibert reacted by shifting into reverse and driving backwards, thus slamming into Wilson's car.
Procedure: Trial court found that Sibert was not negligent; Plaintiff appeals.
Issue: Did the court err in denying a motion for directed verdict? Did it err in adding the sudden emergency doctrine to the jury instructions (by prejudicing the jury)?
Holding: No and No.
Reasoning: The motion was correctly denied because the facts allowed for a reasonable diversity of opinions. Jury instructions are left up to the trial court unless there is evidence of an abuse of discretion.
Stewart v. Motts
Stewart v. Motts
539 Pa. 596, 654 A.2d 535 (1995)
Facts: Plaintiff, Stewart, stopped at defendant's auto shop and offered to help the defendant, Motts, repair an automobile fuel tank. The plaintiff suggested a course of action; the defendant agreed. The exact sequence of events is contested, but the car backfired and burned the plaintiff. The plaintiff argues on appeal that the judge should have instructed the jury that the circumstances required a "high degree of care."
Procedure: Trial court found for the defendant; plaintiff appeals.
Issue: Should the defendant have used a "high degree of care" in handling gasoline?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: The standard of "reasonable care" never varies; only what is reasonable under the circumstances. Reasonable care is always proportionate to the danger of the act.
539 Pa. 596, 654 A.2d 535 (1995)
Facts: Plaintiff, Stewart, stopped at defendant's auto shop and offered to help the defendant, Motts, repair an automobile fuel tank. The plaintiff suggested a course of action; the defendant agreed. The exact sequence of events is contested, but the car backfired and burned the plaintiff. The plaintiff argues on appeal that the judge should have instructed the jury that the circumstances required a "high degree of care."
Procedure: Trial court found for the defendant; plaintiff appeals.
Issue: Should the defendant have used a "high degree of care" in handling gasoline?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: The standard of "reasonable care" never varies; only what is reasonable under the circumstances. Reasonable care is always proportionate to the danger of the act.
Friday, September 12, 2008
Thursday, September 11, 2008
McCulloch v. Maryland
McCulloch v. Maryland
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)
Facts: Maryland tried to tax the federal bank; the bank refused to pay. (McCulloch worked for the bank).
Procedure: James v. McCulloch was the trial, which was decided for the plaintiff.
Issue: (a) Can the federal government/congress charter a bank? (b) Can the states tax it?
Holding: (a) Yes and (b) no.
Reasoning: (a) The fed gov't has the ability to use the means to pursue it's constitutional powers, unless those means have been specifically prohibited/restricted by the constitution. (b) The federal gov't is not a subject of the states, it is the government of the states; also the other states are indirectly taxed by Maryland's federal tax, which is taxation without representation or recourse.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)
Facts: Maryland tried to tax the federal bank; the bank refused to pay. (McCulloch worked for the bank).
Procedure: James v. McCulloch was the trial, which was decided for the plaintiff.
Issue: (a) Can the federal government/congress charter a bank? (b) Can the states tax it?
Holding: (a) Yes and (b) no.
Reasoning: (a) The fed gov't has the ability to use the means to pursue it's constitutional powers, unless those means have been specifically prohibited/restricted by the constitution. (b) The federal gov't is not a subject of the states, it is the government of the states; also the other states are indirectly taxed by Maryland's federal tax, which is taxation without representation or recourse.
Record Time?
Whoa! Over 100 posts already. Maybe I'll wait until 500 to celebrate.
(Three weeks and I've already killed the digital equivalent of a one-subject notebook...)
(Three weeks and I've already killed the digital equivalent of a one-subject notebook...)
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
Supreme Court of the United States, 1980
444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed. 2d 490.
Facts: The Robinsons bought a car in New York. A year later they moved to Arizona. On the way, in Oklahoma, they got rear-ended which started a fire that severely burned Kay Robinison and the children. The Robinsons brought a product-liability action in the District Court for Creek County, OK against the World-Wide Volkswagen (among others).
Procedure: The current plaintiff tried to get the trail judge of the Robinson case to admit that there was no jurisdiction over them under the Due Process clause. When the judge refused, they sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. The supreme court denied, and so they appealed.
Issue: Does the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth amendment allow for in personam jurisdiction in a case where the only connection to the location is that the accident happened there?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: There are no contacts with the state and the mere "forseeability" of one of it's products passing through it is not enough.
Supreme Court of the United States, 1980
444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed. 2d 490.
Facts: The Robinsons bought a car in New York. A year later they moved to Arizona. On the way, in Oklahoma, they got rear-ended which started a fire that severely burned Kay Robinison and the children. The Robinsons brought a product-liability action in the District Court for Creek County, OK against the World-Wide Volkswagen (among others).
Procedure: The current plaintiff tried to get the trail judge of the Robinson case to admit that there was no jurisdiction over them under the Due Process clause. When the judge refused, they sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. The supreme court denied, and so they appealed.
Issue: Does the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth amendment allow for in personam jurisdiction in a case where the only connection to the location is that the accident happened there?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: There are no contacts with the state and the mere "forseeability" of one of it's products passing through it is not enough.
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.
109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910)
Facts: Defendant's ship was moored at Plaintiff's dock during a storm, which cause some $500 in damages to the dock.
Procedure: Jury trial court found for the plaintiff.
Issue: Does necessity defense apply?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: Yes, there was necessity, but they should still pay because their act caused the damages (sort of no-fault-ish). It was calculated to save the ship at the expense of the dock, and the expense of the dock will be paid.
109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910)
Facts: Defendant's ship was moored at Plaintiff's dock during a storm, which cause some $500 in damages to the dock.
Procedure: Jury trial court found for the plaintiff.
Issue: Does necessity defense apply?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: Yes, there was necessity, but they should still pay because their act caused the damages (sort of no-fault-ish). It was calculated to save the ship at the expense of the dock, and the expense of the dock will be paid.
Ploof v. Putnam
Ploof v. Putnam
81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908)
Facts: A storm came up on Lake Champlain, and the plaintiff moored his boat on the defendant's dock. The defendant through his servant unmoored the boat, which destroyed the boat and harmed the plaintiff and his family. Plaintiff claims that necessity made his mooring not a trespass, and that defendant shouldn't have unmoored him.
Procedure: Not clear.
Issue: Was there a trespass?
Holding: No, so the unmooring was therefore not a defense of property.
Reasoning: Necessity, especially to preserve lives, certainly allows people to pass onto a property without trespass.
81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908)
Facts: A storm came up on Lake Champlain, and the plaintiff moored his boat on the defendant's dock. The defendant through his servant unmoored the boat, which destroyed the boat and harmed the plaintiff and his family. Plaintiff claims that necessity made his mooring not a trespass, and that defendant shouldn't have unmoored him.
Procedure: Not clear.
Issue: Was there a trespass?
Holding: No, so the unmooring was therefore not a defense of property.
Reasoning: Necessity, especially to preserve lives, certainly allows people to pass onto a property without trespass.
Wegner v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co.
Wegner v. Milwaukee Mutual Ins. Co.
479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991)
Facts: In an attempt to flush out a suspect, cops tore up Wegner's house pretty bad. Wegner sued both the city and Milwaukee Mutual to recover damages for the destruction.
Procedure: Trial court and then appellate...
Issue: Does the necessity defense apply?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: The defense is a common law one, while the statute requiring recovery is a statute and therefore controlling.
479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991)
Facts: In an attempt to flush out a suspect, cops tore up Wegner's house pretty bad. Wegner sued both the city and Milwaukee Mutual to recover damages for the destruction.
Procedure: Trial court and then appellate...
Issue: Does the necessity defense apply?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: The defense is a common law one, while the statute requiring recovery is a statute and therefore controlling.
Surocco v. Geary
Surocco v. Geary
3 Cal. 69 (1853)
Facts: Geary, acting for the city of San Fransisco, blew up Surocco's house to make a fire break "in the conflagration then raging." Plaintiff was removing his goods prior to this and could have continued if not for being stopped by the destruction of his house.
Procedure: Trial court found for plaintiffs.
Issue: Can a person be held liable for acting out of necessity?
Holding: Not if necessity is clearly shown.
Reasoning: The well-being of the city is of more import than the individual's property rights, but this necessity must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
3 Cal. 69 (1853)
Facts: Geary, acting for the city of San Fransisco, blew up Surocco's house to make a fire break "in the conflagration then raging." Plaintiff was removing his goods prior to this and could have continued if not for being stopped by the destruction of his house.
Procedure: Trial court found for plaintiffs.
Issue: Can a person be held liable for acting out of necessity?
Holding: Not if necessity is clearly shown.
Reasoning: The well-being of the city is of more import than the individual's property rights, but this necessity must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Wednesday, September 10, 2008
Tuesday, September 9, 2008
Drennan v. Star Paving Co.
Drennan v. Star Paving Co.
California Supreme Court
51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958)
Facts: Defendant, a sub-contractor, made a bid to do some paving for a contracting job. Contractor/plaintiff then made their own bid for the job and won based on their price. The next day (after the bids went through), the defendant showed up at the plaintiff's office and said there was a mistake, and they could only do it for double the price they'd bid. Since they refused to do it for less, the plaintiff shopped around and found someone who would do it for cheaper, but it was still more than the price of the defendant's original bid. Plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of contract, to the amount of the difference between their bid and what the plaintiff ultimately paid.
Procedure: Trial court found for plaintiff.
Issue: Did plaintiff's reliance make the defendant's offer irrevocable?
Holding: Yes.
Reasoning: It was analogous to a unilateral contract, i.e. substantial effort or reliance makes the contract whole. Plaintiff bound themselves to act based on the defendant's terms, so the defendant should also be bound. Affirmed.
California Supreme Court
51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958)
Facts: Defendant, a sub-contractor, made a bid to do some paving for a contracting job. Contractor/plaintiff then made their own bid for the job and won based on their price. The next day (after the bids went through), the defendant showed up at the plaintiff's office and said there was a mistake, and they could only do it for double the price they'd bid. Since they refused to do it for less, the plaintiff shopped around and found someone who would do it for cheaper, but it was still more than the price of the defendant's original bid. Plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of contract, to the amount of the difference between their bid and what the plaintiff ultimately paid.
Procedure: Trial court found for plaintiff.
Issue: Did plaintiff's reliance make the defendant's offer irrevocable?
Holding: Yes.
Reasoning: It was analogous to a unilateral contract, i.e. substantial effort or reliance makes the contract whole. Plaintiff bound themselves to act based on the defendant's terms, so the defendant should also be bound. Affirmed.
James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc.
eJames Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc.
United States Court of Appeals
64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933)
Facts: Gimbel Bros. (the defendant) heard that there was a contract being bid on in Pennsylvania to build a public building; defendant calculated the amount of linoleum required for the building and sent an offer to the bidders on the contract, saying that whomever won the contract with PA could buy their linoleum at one of two price points (varying by quality). Unfortunately, the defendants had underestimated the amount by half. The plaintiff got the offer, and then sent a bid to the PA group based on the amounts stated, and then received the telegram from defendants saying that they were revoking their offer due to the miscalculation and would send one out later for about double the price. (The plaintiff received the offer and such on the 28th of December). On Dec. 30th PA accepted the plaintiff's bid. On the 31st, the plaintiff received the letter of withdrawl (of the offer?) from the defendant. The plaintiff formally accepted the original offer of the defendant, and when the defendant insisted there was no contract, sued for damages.
Procedure: Trial judge found for the defense; plaintiff appealed.
Issue: Was there a contract?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: Using the offer in the course of bidding does not count as relying on it in a meaniful legal way, especially since in the language of the offer you could only accept after you had won the contract from PA.
United States Court of Appeals
64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933)
Facts: Gimbel Bros. (the defendant) heard that there was a contract being bid on in Pennsylvania to build a public building; defendant calculated the amount of linoleum required for the building and sent an offer to the bidders on the contract, saying that whomever won the contract with PA could buy their linoleum at one of two price points (varying by quality). Unfortunately, the defendants had underestimated the amount by half. The plaintiff got the offer, and then sent a bid to the PA group based on the amounts stated, and then received the telegram from defendants saying that they were revoking their offer due to the miscalculation and would send one out later for about double the price. (The plaintiff received the offer and such on the 28th of December). On Dec. 30th PA accepted the plaintiff's bid. On the 31st, the plaintiff received the letter of withdrawl (of the offer?) from the defendant. The plaintiff formally accepted the original offer of the defendant, and when the defendant insisted there was no contract, sued for damages.
Procedure: Trial judge found for the defense; plaintiff appealed.
Issue: Was there a contract?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: Using the offer in the course of bidding does not count as relying on it in a meaniful legal way, especially since in the language of the offer you could only accept after you had won the contract from PA.
Plowman v. Indian Refining Co.
Plowman v. Indian Refining Co.
United States District Court
20 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ill. 1937)
Facts: Several employees were relieved of their duties at IR Co. but remained on the payroll in respect for their long service to the company (they were downsizing for economic reasons). The company maintains that the extended payroll was a gift; the employees maintain that it was contract and supposed to last their entire life. Controverted fact is whether anyone ever mentioned that the payments would go on for life.
Procedure: District Court level.
Issue: Do the past actions of the employees count as consideration?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: It cannot be consideration for a new contract if it has already been given and without reference to the contract. Plus traveling to the office to pick up the check was simply a condition, not consideration.
United States District Court
20 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Ill. 1937)
Facts: Several employees were relieved of their duties at IR Co. but remained on the payroll in respect for their long service to the company (they were downsizing for economic reasons). The company maintains that the extended payroll was a gift; the employees maintain that it was contract and supposed to last their entire life. Controverted fact is whether anyone ever mentioned that the payments would go on for life.
Procedure: District Court level.
Issue: Do the past actions of the employees count as consideration?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: It cannot be consideration for a new contract if it has already been given and without reference to the contract. Plus traveling to the office to pick up the check was simply a condition, not consideration.
Monday, September 8, 2008
Doe v. Johnson
Doe v. Johnson
817 F.Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993)
Facts: Johnson transmitted HIV to Jane Doe through consensual sexual contact. He didn't warn her that he might have it or use a condom.
Procedure: Considering a motion to dismiss at the trial level.
Issue: Was it a battery?
Holding: Yes.
Reasoning: One who knows he has a venereal disease and knows his partner doesn't know, commits a tort by having intercourse, consensual or not.
817 F.Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993)
Facts: Johnson transmitted HIV to Jane Doe through consensual sexual contact. He didn't warn her that he might have it or use a condom.
Procedure: Considering a motion to dismiss at the trial level.
Issue: Was it a battery?
Holding: Yes.
Reasoning: One who knows he has a venereal disease and knows his partner doesn't know, commits a tort by having intercourse, consensual or not.
Kennedy v. Parrott
Kennedy v. Parrott
243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956)
Facts: Plaintiff consented to an appendectomy; her doctor, while operating, the doc noticed some cysts and operated on them too. After the operation, the plaintiff developed phlebitis in her leg and sued the doctor for battery (thinking the vein cut while operating on the cysts led to blood clots).
Procedure: Trial level held a nonsuit for the defendant.
Issue: Did her consent cover the extended touching?
Holding: Yes.
Reasoning: When a surgeon is acting in a professional capacity, consent should be construed as broadly as possible (as a matter of policy). (PS- no longer good law.)
243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956)
Facts: Plaintiff consented to an appendectomy; her doctor, while operating, the doc noticed some cysts and operated on them too. After the operation, the plaintiff developed phlebitis in her leg and sued the doctor for battery (thinking the vein cut while operating on the cysts led to blood clots).
Procedure: Trial level held a nonsuit for the defendant.
Issue: Did her consent cover the extended touching?
Holding: Yes.
Reasoning: When a surgeon is acting in a professional capacity, consent should be construed as broadly as possible (as a matter of policy). (PS- no longer good law.)
Ashcraft v. King
Ashcraft v. King
228 Cal.App.3d 604, 278 Cal.Rptr. 900 (1991)
Facts: Woman consented to an operation as long as any required blood transfusions were made from family donated blood; hospital took family blood but used the hospital stores anyway. Woman got AIDS from the HIV positive blood the hospital used.
Procedure: (It's an appellate court, but the procedural history isn't explicit.)
Issue: Was it a battery, or did she consent?
Holding: Battery.
Reasoning: Her consent had limits; their behavior went beyond it.
228 Cal.App.3d 604, 278 Cal.Rptr. 900 (1991)
Facts: Woman consented to an operation as long as any required blood transfusions were made from family donated blood; hospital took family blood but used the hospital stores anyway. Woman got AIDS from the HIV positive blood the hospital used.
Procedure: (It's an appellate court, but the procedural history isn't explicit.)
Issue: Was it a battery, or did she consent?
Holding: Battery.
Reasoning: Her consent had limits; their behavior went beyond it.
Reavis v. Slominski
Reavis v. Slominski
250 Neb. 711, 551 N.W.2d 528 (1996)
Facts: Reavis was the employee of Slominski. They'd had prior sexual relations during a prior period of her employment with him, however the incident in question was the first since she'd resumed working for him. Both were at least somewhat intoxicated and alone with each other when Slominski locked a door and started kissing her. Reavis said no, but eventually went along because she felt she couldn't do anything and that Slominski would just laugh. The intercourse hurt her. She sued for battery since her actions didn't amount to consent, and even if they did, they wouldn't count because she had an abnormal ability to refuse sexual intercourse as a result of childhood sexual abuse.
Procedure: Trial court jury found for Reavis. Appealed by Slominski.
Issue: Did her words and actions amount to consent?
Holding: Perhaps; remanded for new trial.
Reasoning: The trial court erred in refusing to tell the jury that (a) incapacity only cancels out consent if that incapacity affects her ability to understand and judge her conduct and (b) the defendant has to have knowledge of that incapacity.
250 Neb. 711, 551 N.W.2d 528 (1996)
Facts: Reavis was the employee of Slominski. They'd had prior sexual relations during a prior period of her employment with him, however the incident in question was the first since she'd resumed working for him. Both were at least somewhat intoxicated and alone with each other when Slominski locked a door and started kissing her. Reavis said no, but eventually went along because she felt she couldn't do anything and that Slominski would just laugh. The intercourse hurt her. She sued for battery since her actions didn't amount to consent, and even if they did, they wouldn't count because she had an abnormal ability to refuse sexual intercourse as a result of childhood sexual abuse.
Procedure: Trial court jury found for Reavis. Appealed by Slominski.
Issue: Did her words and actions amount to consent?
Holding: Perhaps; remanded for new trial.
Reasoning: The trial court erred in refusing to tell the jury that (a) incapacity only cancels out consent if that incapacity affects her ability to understand and judge her conduct and (b) the defendant has to have knowledge of that incapacity.
Baksakis v. Demotsis
Baksakis v. Demotsis
Texas Court of Civil Appeals
226 S.W.2d 673 (1949)
Facts: Defendant borrowed some money from plaintiff during the war; it is claimed that there was no consideration, so it wasn't paid back. (The amount delivered to the plaintiff was worth $25 US Dollars, but the letter in question treats it at worth $2k US Dollars).
Procedure: Plaintiff sued to recover the $2k with interest. Trial court (without a jury) found in favor for the plaintiff to the amount of $750, with interest. Plaintiff appealed.
Issue: Was there consideration?
Holding: Yes.
Reasoning: Just because the consideration was inadequate does not mean it is not consideration. "Defendant got exactly what she contracted for."
Texas Court of Civil Appeals
226 S.W.2d 673 (1949)
Facts: Defendant borrowed some money from plaintiff during the war; it is claimed that there was no consideration, so it wasn't paid back. (The amount delivered to the plaintiff was worth $25 US Dollars, but the letter in question treats it at worth $2k US Dollars).
Procedure: Plaintiff sued to recover the $2k with interest. Trial court (without a jury) found in favor for the plaintiff to the amount of $750, with interest. Plaintiff appealed.
Issue: Was there consideration?
Holding: Yes.
Reasoning: Just because the consideration was inadequate does not mean it is not consideration. "Defendant got exactly what she contracted for."
Saturday, September 6, 2008
Dougherty v. Salt
Dougherty v. Salt
New York Court of Appeals
227 N.Y. 200, 125 N.E. 94 (1919)
Facts: Aunt gives a boy a note for $3k, payable on her death or any time before.
Procedure: Trial judge found for the defendant; appellate court reversed the dismissal; defendant appeals.
Issue: Is there a consideration if the giver of a gift/promise says so?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: The consideration must exist in reality somewhere, and besides, the story pretty much proves that it was just a gift.
New York Court of Appeals
227 N.Y. 200, 125 N.E. 94 (1919)
Facts: Aunt gives a boy a note for $3k, payable on her death or any time before.
Procedure: Trial judge found for the defendant; appellate court reversed the dismissal; defendant appeals.
Issue: Is there a consideration if the giver of a gift/promise says so?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: The consideration must exist in reality somewhere, and besides, the story pretty much proves that it was just a gift.
Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. American Ash Recycling Corp. of Pennsylvania
Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. American Ash Recycling Corp. of Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania Superior Court
895 A.2d 595 (2006)
Facts: Pennsy Supply was subcontracted to do some paving; the people who put up the contract mentioned that American Ash had some free AggRite for the project. Pennsy used it; the paving cracked, and they had to redo it and dispose of the AggRite, which is classed as toxic waste. Pennsy sued American Ash for the disposal costs, which it only incurred because the product was defective, and which it saved American Ash by using it for the project.
Procedure: Trial court dismissed; Pennsy appealed.
Issue: Was there consideration?
Holding: Yes. (Remanded for further proceedings.)
Reasoning: It wasn't a gift because American Ash received a benefit from the arrangement, which was the reason they were offering it free in the first place. "Complaint alleges facts which, if proven, would show the promise induced the detriment and the detriment induced the promise. This would be consideration."
Pennsylvania Superior Court
895 A.2d 595 (2006)
Facts: Pennsy Supply was subcontracted to do some paving; the people who put up the contract mentioned that American Ash had some free AggRite for the project. Pennsy used it; the paving cracked, and they had to redo it and dispose of the AggRite, which is classed as toxic waste. Pennsy sued American Ash for the disposal costs, which it only incurred because the product was defective, and which it saved American Ash by using it for the project.
Procedure: Trial court dismissed; Pennsy appealed.
Issue: Was there consideration?
Holding: Yes. (Remanded for further proceedings.)
Reasoning: It wasn't a gift because American Ash received a benefit from the arrangement, which was the reason they were offering it free in the first place. "Complaint alleges facts which, if proven, would show the promise induced the detriment and the detriment induced the promise. This would be consideration."
Hamer v. Sidway
Hamer v. Sidway
New York Court of Appeals
124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891)
Facts: A boy's uncle said that if refrained from certain vices until his 21st birthday, the uncle would give him $5k. Upon the boy's 21st birthday, the uncle said that he would hold it with interest for the boy until some unspecified time; he then died. The boy brought the suit against his uncle's estate.
Procedure: New York trial court found for the estate; special term of the trial court found for the boy; estate appealed.
Issue: Was the giving up of a legal right which may never the less benefited the one who gave it up a consideration?
Holding: Yes.
Reasoning: Giving up a legal right is a consideration, no matter if the act of giving it up confers some "benefit."
New York Court of Appeals
124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891)
Facts: A boy's uncle said that if refrained from certain vices until his 21st birthday, the uncle would give him $5k. Upon the boy's 21st birthday, the uncle said that he would hold it with interest for the boy until some unspecified time; he then died. The boy brought the suit against his uncle's estate.
Procedure: New York trial court found for the estate; special term of the trial court found for the boy; estate appealed.
Issue: Was the giving up of a legal right which may never the less benefited the one who gave it up a consideration?
Holding: Yes.
Reasoning: Giving up a legal right is a consideration, no matter if the act of giving it up confers some "benefit."
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.
355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957)
Facts: McGee, a California resident, received a judgment in her favor against International Life Ins. Co. in a California court. (There was a law in California saying that if a foreign corporation has insurance contracts with state residents, it can be sued in California even if the corporation could not be served in California). Since McGee couldn't collect in California, she went to a Texas court, which refused to honor the suit under the 14th amendment.
Procedure: McGee sued I.L.I. Co. in California, tried to have the Texas courts enforce it, and they refused. McGee appealed.
Issue: Did the California courts have jurisdiction?
Holding: Yes
Reasoning: The trend has been towards expanding the power of the states' ability to exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations; the SC believes this is a good thing and that the contract with a resident is enough for minimum contact.
355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957)
Facts: McGee, a California resident, received a judgment in her favor against International Life Ins. Co. in a California court. (There was a law in California saying that if a foreign corporation has insurance contracts with state residents, it can be sued in California even if the corporation could not be served in California). Since McGee couldn't collect in California, she went to a Texas court, which refused to honor the suit under the 14th amendment.
Procedure: McGee sued I.L.I. Co. in California, tried to have the Texas courts enforce it, and they refused. McGee appealed.
Issue: Did the California courts have jurisdiction?
Holding: Yes
Reasoning: The trend has been towards expanding the power of the states' ability to exercise jurisdiction over foreign corporations; the SC believes this is a good thing and that the contract with a resident is enough for minimum contact.
Friday, September 5, 2008
Thursday, September 4, 2008
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
International Shoe Co. v. Washington
Supreme Court of the United States, 1945.
326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95.
Facts: Washington had a statute that required employers to pay a certain amount per year into a state unemployment fund. (The amount is a percentage of the wages paid annually by an employer for his employees' "services in the state.") International Shoe Co., a Delaware corporation, never made those contributions. Washington personally served a sales solicitor employed by I.S. Co. in the state, and mailed a copy to the St. Louis, Missouri address of I.S. Co. I.S. Co. refused to pay, and claimed that service upon the salesman wasn't proper service to I.S. Co., and that the company was not based in Washington nor doing business there, nor employing anyone there within the meaning of the statute.
Procedure: I.S. Co. appeared before the office of unemployment to appeal, and the unemployment tribunal ruled against I.S. Co.; the Commissioner affirmed (the Commissioner was also a party to that tribunal?). Both the Superior Court and the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed. Appellant, I.S. Co., says the statutes as applied infringe the 14th Amendment's due process clause and the commerce clause.
Issue: Did the appellant submit themselves to Washington's jurisdiction via the 14th Amendment? And, is the statute (as applied) even legal via the 14th Amendment?
Holding: Yes and yes.
Reasoning: It's difficult to see where the line is drawn for substantial behavior within a state, but the amount of time and consistency of behavior involved seems to put I.S. Co on the substantial behavior side of it- so yes, there was jurisdiction. And no, the statute is not being pursued in such a way to violate either due the process or commerce clause.
Supreme Court of the United States, 1945.
326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95.
Facts: Washington had a statute that required employers to pay a certain amount per year into a state unemployment fund. (The amount is a percentage of the wages paid annually by an employer for his employees' "services in the state.") International Shoe Co., a Delaware corporation, never made those contributions. Washington personally served a sales solicitor employed by I.S. Co. in the state, and mailed a copy to the St. Louis, Missouri address of I.S. Co. I.S. Co. refused to pay, and claimed that service upon the salesman wasn't proper service to I.S. Co., and that the company was not based in Washington nor doing business there, nor employing anyone there within the meaning of the statute.
Procedure: I.S. Co. appeared before the office of unemployment to appeal, and the unemployment tribunal ruled against I.S. Co.; the Commissioner affirmed (the Commissioner was also a party to that tribunal?). Both the Superior Court and the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed. Appellant, I.S. Co., says the statutes as applied infringe the 14th Amendment's due process clause and the commerce clause.
Issue: Did the appellant submit themselves to Washington's jurisdiction via the 14th Amendment? And, is the statute (as applied) even legal via the 14th Amendment?
Holding: Yes and yes.
Reasoning: It's difficult to see where the line is drawn for substantial behavior within a state, but the amount of time and consistency of behavior involved seems to put I.S. Co on the substantial behavior side of it- so yes, there was jurisdiction. And no, the statute is not being pursued in such a way to violate either due the process or commerce clause.
Wednesday, September 3, 2008
Brown v. Martinez
Brown v. Martinez
68 N.M. 271, 361 P.2d 152 (1961)
Facts: Some kids entered a garden; the landowner shot away from them, hoping to scare them, and actually hit a kid running in the other direction.
Procedure: Trial court dismissed claim for damages by Brown; he (on behalf of his son) appealed.
Issue: Can you shoot somebody for being on your property?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: People > property.
68 N.M. 271, 361 P.2d 152 (1961)
Facts: Some kids entered a garden; the landowner shot away from them, hoping to scare them, and actually hit a kid running in the other direction.
Procedure: Trial court dismissed claim for damages by Brown; he (on behalf of his son) appealed.
Issue: Can you shoot somebody for being on your property?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: People > property.
Katko v. Briney
Katko v. Briney
C183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971)
Facts: The owners of an abandoned farmhouse (the Brineys) were tired of break ins and set up a spring-gun trap. Two people broke in, and one of them got shot (Katko).
Procedure: Trial court found for plaintiff and awarded damages.
Issue: Is protection of property a legit defense for shooting?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: People's lives and well being are not worth less than a misdemeanor.
C183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971)
Facts: The owners of an abandoned farmhouse (the Brineys) were tired of break ins and set up a spring-gun trap. Two people broke in, and one of them got shot (Katko).
Procedure: Trial court found for plaintiff and awarded damages.
Issue: Is protection of property a legit defense for shooting?
Holding: No.
Reasoning: People's lives and well being are not worth less than a misdemeanor.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Paul
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Paul
256 Md. 643, 261 A.2d 731 (1970)
Facts: Paul, an elderly man just getting over a heart attack, was shopping in an odd way (he would leave his cart at the end of the aisle and relay goods from the aisle back to the cart). An assistant manager saw him and thought he'd stolen something; the assistant manager marched Paul to the manager's office and had him searched. Paul claimed that this incident aggravated his heart condition and caused him pain and suffering.
Procedure: Jury found for Paul; A&P appeals. A&P argues that Maryland should adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 120A (1965), where it is not a false imprisonment if you believed someone to have stolen from you.
Issue: Should Maryland adopt the restatement? (and if they did, would it mean the false imprisonment charge was in error?)
Holding: No (and no)
Reasoning: The shopkeeper can detain people he suspects of theft, but if he is wrong, then it is a tort; the shopkeeper has both that privilege and that risk. (Furthermore, the store had no probable cause anyway).
256 Md. 643, 261 A.2d 731 (1970)
Facts: Paul, an elderly man just getting over a heart attack, was shopping in an odd way (he would leave his cart at the end of the aisle and relay goods from the aisle back to the cart). An assistant manager saw him and thought he'd stolen something; the assistant manager marched Paul to the manager's office and had him searched. Paul claimed that this incident aggravated his heart condition and caused him pain and suffering.
Procedure: Jury found for Paul; A&P appeals. A&P argues that Maryland should adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 120A (1965), where it is not a false imprisonment if you believed someone to have stolen from you.
Issue: Should Maryland adopt the restatement? (and if they did, would it mean the false imprisonment charge was in error?)
Holding: No (and no)
Reasoning: The shopkeeper can detain people he suspects of theft, but if he is wrong, then it is a tort; the shopkeeper has both that privilege and that risk. (Furthermore, the store had no probable cause anyway).
Tuesday, September 2, 2008
Harlow & Jones, Inc. v. Advance Steel Co.
Harlow & Jones, Inc. v. Advance Steel Co.
United States District Court
424 F.Supp. 770 (E.D. Mich. 1976)
Facts: Through an intermediary, Stewart (president of Advance Steel) found that he could purchase 1000 tons of steel from Harlow (whose president was Greve). Stewart/Advance indicated that he was interested on July 2, 1974. On July 9, 1974, Greve/Harlow mailed Stewart/Advance a sales form confirming a sale. That same day, Greve/Harlow placed an order with Centro Stahlhandel for the steel and included a copy of the form that they had sent Stewart/Advance. Stewart/Advance did receive the form, but never signed or returned the copy as requested. On July 19, 1974, Stewart prepared and mailed Advance's purchase order to Greve/Harlow (with some minor revisions on the shipping dates from Greve/Harlow's form); this purchase order was never signed or returned.
The steel was delivered in three shipments; Advance rejected the last shipment, claiming it was late. Harlow insisted they had to buy it and that it wasn't late. Harlow claims that Advance accepted their offer when they sent the purchase order. Advance says their purchase order was a counteroffer which Harlow accepted when they sent the first two shipments.
Procedure: District Court/trial level
Issue: When was a contract entered into? Which terms are correct?
Holding: Orally, at the beginning of the interaction between the companies; everything afterwords was just working out the particulars. The particulars will include what they agreed on and none of what they didn't.
Reasoning: Not only is that how it's usually done in international steel transactions, but both parties acted as if it were done that way. This, combined with the evidence, shows that there was no material delay. (Part of the evidence includes the usual standards of international steel trade.)
United States District Court
424 F.Supp. 770 (E.D. Mich. 1976)
Facts: Through an intermediary, Stewart (president of Advance Steel) found that he could purchase 1000 tons of steel from Harlow (whose president was Greve). Stewart/Advance indicated that he was interested on July 2, 1974. On July 9, 1974, Greve/Harlow mailed Stewart/Advance a sales form confirming a sale. That same day, Greve/Harlow placed an order with Centro Stahlhandel for the steel and included a copy of the form that they had sent Stewart/Advance. Stewart/Advance did receive the form, but never signed or returned the copy as requested. On July 19, 1974, Stewart prepared and mailed Advance's purchase order to Greve/Harlow (with some minor revisions on the shipping dates from Greve/Harlow's form); this purchase order was never signed or returned.
The steel was delivered in three shipments; Advance rejected the last shipment, claiming it was late. Harlow insisted they had to buy it and that it wasn't late. Harlow claims that Advance accepted their offer when they sent the purchase order. Advance says their purchase order was a counteroffer which Harlow accepted when they sent the first two shipments.
Procedure: District Court/trial level
Issue: When was a contract entered into? Which terms are correct?
Holding: Orally, at the beginning of the interaction between the companies; everything afterwords was just working out the particulars. The particulars will include what they agreed on and none of what they didn't.
Reasoning: Not only is that how it's usually done in international steel transactions, but both parties acted as if it were done that way. This, combined with the evidence, shows that there was no material delay. (Part of the evidence includes the usual standards of international steel trade.)
McCann v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
McCann v. Walmart Stores, Inc.
210 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2000).
Facts: The McCann mother and her sons were shopping at a Wal-Mart when they were mistaken for another family who had been forbidden to shop there (the other family had a son who'd been caught shoplifting). The Wal-Mart employees detained the family, saying that they had to stay and that they were calling the police. The McCanns were there at Wal-Mart's behest for about an hour.
Procedure: The McCanns sued for false imprisonment. Jury awarded them $20k; Wal-Mart appeals.
Issue: Were the McCanns actually confined?
Holding: Yes.
Reasoning: Among other things, confinement can be based on a false assertion of legal authority to confine. Wal-Mart asserts that there must be actual, physical restraint, quoting Kowlton v. Ross; the judge says that the language is taken out of context and was simply used to illustrate that in no way was the plaintiff in that case restrained.
210 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2000).
Facts: The McCann mother and her sons were shopping at a Wal-Mart when they were mistaken for another family who had been forbidden to shop there (the other family had a son who'd been caught shoplifting). The Wal-Mart employees detained the family, saying that they had to stay and that they were calling the police. The McCanns were there at Wal-Mart's behest for about an hour.
Procedure: The McCanns sued for false imprisonment. Jury awarded them $20k; Wal-Mart appeals.
Issue: Were the McCanns actually confined?
Holding: Yes.
Reasoning: Among other things, confinement can be based on a false assertion of legal authority to confine. Wal-Mart asserts that there must be actual, physical restraint, quoting Kowlton v. Ross; the judge says that the language is taken out of context and was simply used to illustrate that in no way was the plaintiff in that case restrained.
Monday, September 1, 2008
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